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Abstract 
Bourdieu has an interesting and potentially fruitful relation to discourse 
analysis, even though, or perhaps because, he demotes the role of discourse in 
social practice, is critical of discourse analysis, and is more interested in the 
power effects of discourse in particular contexts and instances than discourse as 
such. I shall explain the relevance of his work for understanding language and 
politics by introducing the main concepts through which he interprets practice: 
habitus, field, capitals, the scholastic fallacy and symbolic power. I end with a 
brief assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of his contribution. 
 
Key words: language, habitus, field, market, struggles, symbolic power. 
 
Structure: Introduction, key concepts, symbolic power and the struggles of the 
social field, and concluding assessment. 
 
Bio 
Andrew Sayer is Professor of Social Theory and Political Economy at Lancaster 
Universiy. His publications have been in the areas of philosophy of social science 
(e.g. Realism and Social Science, 2000, Routledge), ethics and social science (Why 
Things Matter to People, 2011, Cambridge University Press), class (The Moral 
Significance of Class, 2005, CUP) and political economy (e.g. Why We Can’t Afford 





More than anything, Pierre Bourdieu’s work was concerned with power. He was 
particularly interested in the ‘soft forms of domination’ that operate largely 
unnoticed and without coercion, and through which, in his view, many 
inequalities are reproduced. Discourse is a medium of such power, and his 
interest in language was primarily concerned with this aspect, for he considered 
it rare for language in everyday life to operate purely as a means of 
communication. His social theory of action emphasized embodied dispositions 
and semi-conscious practical skills and tendencies rather than discourse and 
conscious reasoning, know-how rather than knowing-that, and he continually 
attacked the academic or ‘scholastic’ tendency to reconstruct action in terms of 
reason, and indeed to reduce action to understanding, or discourse. For 
Bourdieu, much of what influences us does so below our reflexive radar, and is 
all the more powerful for that. Not surprisingly, his analyses are marked by a 
hermeneutics of suspicion rather than a hermeneutics of sympathy that affirms 
peoples’ self-understanding. The result is a series of powerful, stinging critiques 
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of domination, including that exercised unknowingly in the educational field by 
academics. 
 
Although Bourdieu’s writing contains examples of analyses of discourse – most 
formally in his studies of teacher-student interactions in schools and 
universities, and more informally in his discussions of political discourse, he was 
a fierce critic of ‘discourse analysis’, and of what he saw as excessive and 
misplaced emphasis on discourse in some parts of social science (Bourdieu 1991, 
p.28). His own use of language has received much comment, particularly 
regarding his use of unusually long sentences with multiple subordinate clauses 
– a practice he defended, in somewhat paranoid manner, as necessary for pre-
empting any possible mis-readings, especially where critics quote his work. 
Linguists might be tempted to dismiss Bourdieu for all these reasons. But it 
would be a grave mistake, for his work is immensely useful for anyone interested 
in discourse, particularly critical discourse analysis and socio-linguistics, and 
indeed for anyone interested in language and power. He was a formidable and 
remarkably perceptive writer. One can hardly read his most famous work, 
Distinction, one of the most important books in 20th century social science, 
without being struck by his command of the language of critical description in 
his analyses of everyday actions and ideas, and his ability to name normally 
hidden forms of domination (Bourdieu 1986). 
 
To understand Bourdieu one has to grasp his key concepts – particularly habitus, 
field and capital – and how they complement each other in the study of social life. 
Yet he always emphasized that they could only be assessed when put to use in 
studying the social world. Bourdieu’s researches were always much more than a 
‘naming-of-parts’ through the deployment of these terms; by engaging with the 
content of the practices and discourse in their social context he produces 
interpretations of striking critical power. I recommend, for example, his brilliant 
analyses in Language and Symbolic Power of condescension, euphemism, 
working class masculinity, and the silencing power that legitimate language and 
its users can have over others, and of political discourse (Bourdieu 1991).  
 
So I shall first outline his primary concepts of habitus, field and capital, and his 
critique of what he called ‘the scholastic fallacy’ in interpreting the role of 
discourse in social life. I shall then show, via examples relating to language, how 
he combined these to analyse symbolic domination and the struggles or 




Habitus, Bourdieu’s most famous concept, refers to the set of durable 
dispositions that individuals acquire through socialisation, particularly in early 
life, and which orient them towards the social and physical world around them. 
Given that these dispositions are acquired and embodied through repeated 
involvement in social relations and practices of the kinds peculiar to their 
situation, Bourdieu argues that there is a rough fit between the habitus and the 
individual’s habitat, between their dispositions and their social positions. These 
dispositions in turn give rise to behaviours which tend to reproduce the very 
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conditions in which those dispositions were formed. The dispositions are semi-
conscious, involving a kind of ‘feel for the game’ that can neither be reduced to 
discursive knowledge nor adequately explained by it. The expert tennis player 
can return the ball skilfully without thinking about it or being able to offer a good 
explanation of how she does it. The dispositions are acquired semi-consciously, 
partly with awareness, partly without, and they involve comportment and ways 
of using the body, including in speech. We know so much more than we can tell, 
and are affected by so much more than words and other influences that we are 
aware of. We have a feel for the game of talking in familiar situations, but feel 
awkward and ‘don’t know what to say’ in a situation to which our habitus is not 
adjusted.  
 
The different habitus of working, middle and upper class speakers involves not 
only different vocabularies and ways of speaking, but different relations to 
language. In France, among the educated classes, articulacy and command of 
language are highly valued, whereas it is less so among the equivalent class in 
the United States, as research by Michèle Lamont – inspired by Bourdieu -  shows 
(Lamont 1992). In the UK there is often a certain disdain among working class 
people for such articulacy, indicating a mistrust of those whose command of 
language indicates not only a different social class but a removal from the world 
of work and necessity, and possibly lack of appreciation of it. Being a man or 
woman ‘of few words’, and ‘just getting on with it’ implies strength and solidity, 
down-to-earthness, and has greater value for them. Those in the middle, the 
petty-bourgeois, tend to develop a habitus characterised by social anxiety in 
relation to the dominant classes – through fear of being ‘found out’, and fear of 
slipping down into the working class or being mistaken for them. Linguistically, 
this comes out in self-consciousness, hyper-correctness and affectation 
(‘commencing’ work, instead of starting it). (These are, of course, general 
observations made by Bourdieu from his researches, and there are of course 
many exceptions - for a host of possible reasons, mostly to do with particularities 
of socialization.) 
 
Linguistic capacities are embodied, most obviously, in the way the mouth is used 
when speaking. Compare the loose, free speech of many working class people 
with the precise, measured, drawn-in, ‘tight-lipped’ talk of some members of the 
dominant classes, suggesting mastery, carrying the threat of a precisely aimed 
put-down, but also inviting suspicions of coldness, misanthropy, and lack of 
generosity (‘tight-arsed’). Since the habitus is classed and gendered, so too are 
ways of talking and writing, but always in relation to and in distinction from 




Individuals, organisations, practices (including uses of language) and objects are 
located within fields of relationships to other individuals, organizations, practices 
and objects, and their behaviour can only be understood by reference to those 
fields. Within the general social field there are local fields specific to major 
activities, such as the fields of politics or education. The concept of field involves 
a triple metaphor: a space in which action and actors take place, a magnetic field 
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of forces, and a battlefield – an arena of competition and struggle for power. The 
behaviour and fortunes of a particular university, for example, can only be 
understood by reference to its position in the national or international university 
field, itself part of the educational field and social field. What my own university 
does and does not do, for example, depends on how it relates comparatively and 
competitively both to Oxbridge and a small number of other universities 
traditionally favoured by the British elite, and to new, less prestigious 
universities recently created from former colleges and polytechnics. What a 
person can say, and with what effect, depends on their position within the social 
field relative to others. The ability of the army officer to order the private to 
clean the latrines, and the consequences of any attempt by the private to tell the 
officer to clean them himself, are a product of the inequalities and power 
relations of the social field. The tendency of the same speech behaviour to be 
regarded as ‘assertive’ in men and ‘strident’ or ‘bossy’ in women is also a field 
effect.  
 
Bourdieu repeatedly criticizes ‘interactionist’ approaches that abstract 
discourses and interlocutors from the fields in which they exist, and thereby 
ignore the power relations within which speakers, writers, listeners and readers 
are located; they reduce relations of power to relations of communication 
(Bourdieu 1977; 1991). What words mean depends on location within the field – 
what is valued by some may be an object of scorn for others - not just because of 
different ‘values’, but because of the objective differences in their position within 
the social field which give rise to different dispositions or habitus. 
 
At times, Bourdieu uses the metaphors of ‘games’ or ‘markets’ to characterise 
fields. Each game/field has its own rules and goals: the rules of the art game, of 
producing, selling, acquiring and displaying art, are different from those of the 
science game, or the political game.  Referring to fields as markets, hence, ‘the 
linguistic market’, allows Bourdieu to emphasize their competitive character and 
the differences in power of the players, and the stakes over which they compete. 
Particular speech acts have ‘prices’ determined not only by their linguistic 
content but by the speaker’s position in the social field relative to interlocuters 
and observers.1 Thus, as Johann Unger shows, Scots language speakers are aware 
that their language has different ‘prices’ in different markets, being valued 
positively in some, and negatively in others (Unger 2013). And of course there 
are linguistic sub-markets or fields such as those of education, politics, 
socialising, sports or entertainment. Bourdieu use of this and other economic 
metaphors – ‘capital’, ‘symbolic profit’ – leads him to develop accounts which 
give a predominantly instrumental character to action, albeit one which is less a 
matter of actors’ intentions or reasons than unconscious or semi-conscious 
strategies that are already inscribed in the habitus.  
 
Thus, one chapter of his Language and Symbolic Power is entitled ‘Price 
Formation and the Anticipation of Profits’ (Bourdieu 1991). The latter refers to 
the way in which speakers have to anticipate the reception of their words in 
                                                        
1 For a critique of Bourdieu’s use of economic metaphors with regard to language, see Grin 
(1994). 
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order to communicate as they intend; this involves an awareness (or feel for the 
game) of the field in which their words are produced and received, and what is 
safe or risky. Again as Unger’s study of Scots shows, as a language which is 
widely spoken but only rarely written, it cannot generally be used in formal 
situations. For those in a subordinate position, communicating with those above 
them often requires accepting and attempting to reproduce styles of speaking 
and writing approved by the dominant groups. This generally fails because 
although they can recognize ‘legitimate language’, their position in the social field 
means they are unlikely to have acquired the appropriate habitus and hence the 
ability to use it. Bourdieu et al’s  Academic Discourse shows how this applies to 
students with different class backgrounds (Bourdieu et al. 1994). The field thus 
exerts a kind of censorship on discourse via agents’ dispositions and their grasp 
and expectations of the form in which it will be acceptable.  
“Any kind of discourse, whatever it may be, is the product of an encounter 
between a linguistic habitus, i.e. a competence that is inextricably both 
technical and social (both the ability to speak and the ability to speak in a 
certain socially marked fashion), and a market, i.e. a system of price 
formation that contributes to give linguistic production an orientation in 
advance. (Bourdieu 2008, p.133) 
In the case of strongly unequal fields, the inability of those in subordinate 
positions to speak in the form that is deemed legitimate by the dominant can 
condemn them ‘to either silence or shocking outspokenness.”(Bourdieu 1991, p. 
139)  
 
This combination of an instrumental view of action with downplaying of 
conscious reasoning makes Bourdieu extremely sceptical about assumptions that 
some kinds of reason or action are ‘disinterested’; for example, the art collector’s 
professed belief to be interested only in the art itself, not its economic or 




Bourdieu’s analysis of inequality and domination is distinctive in that it goes 
beyond differences in economic capital to differences in social and cultural 
capital (Bourdieu 1986b). Social capital refers to connections and networks that 
give agents advantages vis-à-vis others, while cultural capital derives from 
possession of and involvement in the practice and enjoyment of cultural goods 
that are highly valued within the social field through association with dominant 
classes. Cultural capital is partly embodied – involving a certain disposition 
towards the goods in question, so that, for example, the relation of the bourgeois 
to opera might be one of entitled ease, and of the petit-bourgeois anxiety to be 
accepted as knowledgeable of and comfortably familiar with it. As such, the latter 
risks being found out by trying too hard, appearing pretentious, lacking an 
effortless ownership of the art form that characterises the dominant classes’ 
relation to the most prestigious goods. Cultural capital is not just a matter of 
knowing about or liking particular valued cultural goods, but of one’s whole 
relation to them. Educational capital (qualifications) and linguistic capital, are 
varieties of cultural capital, and they exhibit the same general features in that 
they are relational insofar as their ‘price’ depends on the valuation of the whole 
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field and the position of the agent within the field relative to others - superior, 
equal or inferior - and embodied, and, like the habitus, embodied. Although each 
field is different, there are often homologies between them. So those that are in a 
dominant position in one field, say the arts, are likely to share a similar mix and 
volume of capital and tastes and dispositions to those in a dominant position in 
another field, such as education. 
 
Bourdieu argues and demonstrates that the relation between different tastes and 
ways of acting and speaking of agents and their location within the relevant 
fields are not arbitrary, but betray their relation to the world and to the field. 
Underlying oppositions between refined or distinguished v vulgar or common, is 
a distinction between the distance from necessity that marks the lives of the 
dominant classes and the closeness to necessity of the subordinate classes. Thus, 
as regards taste, the dominant have time and leisure and can enjoy superfluity in 
such forms as abstract art, poetry, classics and history, while the subordinate 
expect art to be representational, education to be functional for making a living. 
This is evident in language too, where superfluity (or less charitably, verbosity), 
carefully measured words, slow delivery and freedom from the fear of 
interruption suggest superiority and a confident command of the listener’s 
attention. At a largely pre-reflexive level, this not only expresses dominance but 
confirms it to both speaker and listener. 
 
Having introduced these concepts, we can now proceed to show how they are 
applied, though we must first apply them to the position of academics 
themselves in order to combat a common fallacy. 
 
 
The scholastic fallacy 
Bourdieu did not exempt the academic world from his critiques of social 
practices (Bourdieu 1988, 1994, 1996). While he devastatingly analysed the 
class coordinates and traits of academia, his most fundamental critique of 
academia concerned its methodology – its susceptibility to ‘the scholastic fallacy’, 
This involves the tendency of academics to project (unknowingly) the 
perspective and dispositions of their peculiarly contemplative relation to the 
social world onto those whose relation to the world is primarily practical. 
Habermas’s treatment of ‘communicative reason’ is taken to task for this as an 
extreme example, but the fallacy is much more pervasive (Bourdieu 2000). It 
allows actions to be treated not merely as meaningful but as always consciously 
intended, and in so doing it misunderstands the nature and ‘logic’ of the practice 
and the position of those whose who do not share the contemplative stance of 
academics. It is closely associated with ‘the interactionist fallacy’, in which 
conversations or discourses are examined in abstraction from the position of the 
interlocutors in the social field, their capital and relative power, thereby ignoring 
their profound shaping of the communications, and their production and 
reception (Bourdieu 1977; 1991). 
 
Of all the academic disciplines, philosophy and linguistics are most likely to be 
guilty of this fallacy. Along with it goes an implicitly classed hierarchy of mind 
(the professions, management) over body (manual work). It need not take a 
 7 
rational choice form; ethnographic accounts that seek to render practices as 
texts, are also susceptible to the fallacy. The fallacy unknowingly reflects 
academics’ distance from necessity, and the ease and time for reflection available 
to them.  
 
The disposition towards reflection and scholastic reason are embodied 
capacities of the academic habitus which in its distance from practical necessity 
give it affinities with the habitus of the dominant classes, and this helps to 
explain the easy assimilation of students with high cultural capital into the 
academic field, relative to that of working class students. It’s not only the latter’s 
lack of familiarity with books and high culture, but their habitus, characterised 
by the dominance of practical necessity, and the need to take orders from their 
superiors rather than reason why, that impede them. Further, where social 
classifications and the contingent social divisions in which people live 
correspond, they are likely to become ‘doxa’ – taken for granted, self-evident, 
undiscussed; as Bourdieu puts it, it “goes without saying because it comes 
without saying” (1977, p. 167). 
 
 
Symbolic power and fields of struggle 
Symbolic power is the target of much of Bourdieu’s work, but again, despite the 
emphasis on discourse and imagery, knowledge and recognition, he argues that 
it operates substantially without ‘intentional acts of consciousness.’ It is 
generally not even recognised by the dominated as a form of domination, indeed 
dominant discourses and framings of issues may be accepted and affirmed by 
those who are its victims. 
 
For Bourdieu, this acquiescence is less a product of ideology (a term he avoids), 
‘false consciousness’ or even dominant discourses, than the facticity of the social 
world in which people act. It is primarily a product of habituation to subordinate 
positions and lack of experience of alternatives which produces a bodily 
attunement to them (2000, p.181). “ ... of all the forms of ‘hidden persuasion’, the 
most implacable is the one exerted, quite simply, by the order of things.” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 168, emphasis in original). Recognition is less 
a matter of conscious assessment and deliberation than a product of  
“the set of fundamental, pre-reflexive assumptions that social agents 
engage by the mere fact of taking the world for granted, of accepting the 
world as it is, and of finding it natural because their mind is constructed 
according to cognitive structures that are issued out of the very structures 
of the world.” . . . (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 168).  
Likewise, hegemony is less imposed from above discursively than acquired semi-
consciously from engaging in everyday life within unequal societies. The 
dominated may dream of coming into money and luxury, yet such dreams do not 
subvert the social field, but merely involving imagining occupying a different 
place within it, thereby confirming its legitimacy. Envisaging radical alternatives 
is easier for those whose position affords some distance from necessity.  
 
This emphasis on practice rather than ideology is a powerful counter to those 
who imagine that only the artful and energetic production of ‘ideological 
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discourse’ by the dominant stops an imagined latent protest bursting out at any 
moment. Nevertheless, one has only to look at newspapers, TV and social media 
to see that there is a huge effort given to producing discourses that mostly affirm 
the dominant interpretations of the world. 
 
For Bourdieu the nature and effects of discourse and other practices cannot be 
understood just at the semantic level but always require consideration of the 
field as a material as well as a semantic space. Symbolic power is always field-
dependent: it depends not only on the powerful but the susceptibilities of others 
to their actions, intended or unintended. It is not a tautology to say that 
intimidating or stigmatising speech only works on those who are susceptible to 
them. In everyday life, language is rarely analysed as a linguist or philosopher 
might, for it operates partly below the level of consciousness, because the 
dominated accept and misrecognize the terms in which it is expressed. And the 
‘acceptance’ comes not just from the words, but from the dispositions of 
deference, and felt sense of inferiority that have come to constitute their habitus, 
just as the complementary felt sense of entitlement, superiority and 
condescension are part of the upper class habitus. 
“Symbolic violence is a violence practised in and through ignorance, and 
all the more readily in that those who practise it are unaware they are 
doing so, and those experiencing it unaware they are experiencing it.” 
(Bourdieu 2008, p. 322) 
 
So the submission of a woman to an order from a man doesn’t come just from the 
words he uses or from what she understands them to mean, but from the 
respective habitus they have acquired through their gendered upbringings that 
already pre-dispose the one to defer, acquiesce, serve and appease and the other 
to command, lead and expect compliance. Of course, the ways of exerting this 
power vary with context, including not just the kind of situation but the 
positioning of the two within the social field, but again they derive more from 
habituation and a feel for the game acquired through practice than calculation or 
analytic understanding; and even to the extent that the words and actions are 
calculated they must take into account the relations and inequalities of the social 
field, so as to assess how direct or euphemized the requests or commands need 
to be. One might therefore expect that a woman who had encountered and 
accepted feminist discourses might nevertheless still find it difficult to override 
the tendencies of her habitus when faced with instances of masculine 
domination. Resistance has to be practised repeatedly to change the habitus and 
become second nature. 
 
Symbolic violence is always most effective when the dominated share with the 
dominant the schemes of perception and appreciation through which they are 
perceived by the dominant (as inferior) and through which the dominant 
perceive themselves (as superior). This “knowledge and recognition have to be 
rooted in practical dispositions of acceptance and submission, which, because 
they do not pass through deliberation and decision, escape the dilemma of 
consent or constraint.” (Bourdieu 2000, p.198). The critic who challenges the 
commonsense shared by the dominant and dominated can easily be dismissed by 
pointing to the acquiescence of the dominated as evidence of their being ‘out of 
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touch’ with those whom they claim to represent. Tabloid newspapers make 
money from selling stories of welfare ‘benefit cheats’ to people many of whom 
are likely to receive welfare benefits. Whereas mechanisms producing economic 
inequalities and physical coercion operate without consent, the use of elements 
of the dominant discourse by the dominated gives at least the appearance of 
consent and agreement, simply because communication requires the shared 
capacity to communicate in both parties. And each party has at a basic level to 
accept the other as an interlocutor. But what is shared (’accepted’) may be a 
product of misrecognition. Symbolic violence therefore is a more hidden ‘soft’ 
form of power.  Bourdieu argues that ‘all power owes part of its efficacy – and 
not the least important part – to misrecognition of the mechanisms on which it is 
based.” (Bourdieu 1993a, p.14).  
 
This misrecognition is compounded by those social scientists and philosophers 
who succumb to the scholastic fallacy. According to Bourdieu, their 
misrecognition of their own social position in relation to that of students of 
different classes is revealed in the nuances of condescension, scorn and praise to 
be found in their comments on students’ work and the correspondences between 
these and students’ class position (Bourdieu 1996).  Academic Discourse argues 
that tutors typically fail to appreciate the nature of the power relations of the 
educational field which press students into writing what they don’t understand - 
a kind of misrecognition of misrecognition (Bourdieu et al, 1994). 
 
Fields (or markets) are arenas of struggle and competition in which among other 
things, symbolic power is reproduced and contested. The struggles of the social 
field are not to be reduced simply to randomly-located competing views and 
interests, but always relate to the competing positions and practices of those 
involved. The fields are always unequal but the dominant tend to represent the 
competitive struggles as taking place on a level playing field and without any 
shortages, so everyone can win, even though the prizes are few and monopolized 
by the dominant (Bourdieu 2000, p.225). This, for example, allows modern 
incarnations of the traditional distinction between the deserving and the 
undeserving poor to emerge and to be mobilized against the losers. 
 
The struggles have a three-fold character, involving: 
1. competition for valued goods, practices and positions, for capital; 
2. struggle over what is worthy of value, worthwhile, prestigious, and how 
things are to be named, particularly insofar as names secrete evaluations; 
3. struggle over who has the authority to determine what is of value. 
Language itself can be an object of struggle: there can be competition to acquire 
and use ways of speaking that are accepted as authoritative, ‘posh’ or ‘cool’ (1, 
above); struggles over what is legitimate language – often partly taking place 
through ridicule; for example, over which accents and kinds of speech or writing 
allow their producers to be taken seriously (2); and struggles (3) over who 
defines it: in the UK this usually involves references to ‘the Queen’s English’, 
‘received pronunciation’, and people who are ‘well-spoken’ (as opposed to ‘rough 
spoken’), in which the class locations are unmistakeable if not explicit. 
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Bourdieu analyses the struggles of the social field as ‘strategies’, though he 
applies this to cases where people are acting ‘on automatic’, spontaneously 
according to their habitus, rather than consciously. If we ignore the 
awkwardness of this use of a term normally implying conscious reasoning and 
planning for behaviour which does not (necessarily) involve them, certain typical 
patterns can be identified. 
 
Those who are in dominated positions in the field often use ‘strategies’ of 
deference and compliance, accepting their place, and seeking confirmation of 
respectability from those above. As Bourdieu repeatedly notes, they tend to 
choose what is chosen for them, refusing what they are refused, as ‘not for the 
likes of us’ (e.g. Bourdieu 1986a, p. 374). This refusal is then open to being taken 
by those in more advantageous positions as confirmation of their inferiority, or a 
‘poverty of aspiration’ as UK Prime Minister David Cameron put it. The dominant 
in politics can also reward this acceptance by the dominated of their inferior 
position and keep them in their place through reciprocal gestures of 
condescension, as when they refer to them as ‘hard-working people’.  
 
Frequently, these dominant ways of seeing are internalised by the dominated or 
used to condemn others: the American working class men studied by Lamont 
who blamed themselves for their lack of ‘success’ (Lamont 2000); the British 
people on welfare benefits who suspect their neighbours of being ‘benefit cheats’ 
and thereby seek to exempt themselves from the charge (Shildrick and 
MacDonald 2013); the young women who look down on those sisters who do not 
achieve the required feminine appearance, and mobilise a ‘nice girl’/ ‘slag’ 
distinction; the poor working class people in France, studied by Bourdieu and co-
researchers, who direct their anger at their immigrant neighbours (Bourdieu et 
al. 1999). Often those who police these distinctions most avidly are themselves 
at risk of falling foul of them; where dignity and respect are in question small 
differences may seem to matter. These are horizontal deflections of symbolic 
violence. 
 
In many cases the most dominated are unable to comply with norms of what is 
acceptable – because, for example, there are not enough jobs to go round, so they 
cannot be ‘hard-working families’ - and they often lack the economic, political, 
educational and linguistic resources to resist. Where they do resist, for example, 
by refusing to comply and by demanding respect on their own terms, rather than 
seeking respectability on the terms of the dominant (Sayer 2005), they open 
themselves to counterattacks. Those who do not or cannot comply with ways of 
life misrecognised as available and desirable are fully exposed to a more open 
kind of symbolic violence - what Bourdieu terms ‘class racism’ (Bourdieu 1986a, 
p.179) as ‘chavs’, ‘trailer trash’, ‘scroungers’, ‘skivers’, and as exemplified in the 
US and UK by TV programmes recently dubbed ‘poverty porn’, such as ‘The Jerry 
Springer Show’, and ‘Benefits Street’.  
 
Whether resistance or compliance is involved, one has to appreciate the nature 
of the particular habitus of participants in discourse to understand what they say 
and how they interpret others. Thus in the UK, the common male working class 
disregard for and ridicule of correctness according to dominant, legitimate 
 11 
language is a form of opposition to class position constructed via gender that 
defends a notion of masculinity based on toughness and refuses refinement and 
desire to please others as ‘effeminate’ (1991, p.100). What is going on here 
cannot be understood without reference to their habitus and the field or market 




Bourdieu’s treatment of the discourse of politics is in keeping with this emphasis 
on the field and habitus, and his insistence upon going beyond the meaning of 
the discourse itself. For him, political discourse attempts to defend (or challenge) 
the correspondence between the ways in which people classify and categorize 
their world (‘wealth creators’, ‘working people’, ‘scroungers’, ‘investors’) and the 
objective divisions and practices which sustain and are sustained by current 
commonsense thought and which are reflected in the habitus. Oppositional 
political discourses attempt to break this pre-reflexive acceptance of the 
prevailing structures of the world (‘doxa’) and create a new commonsense. The 
power of naming2 is central to this (‘criminal immigrants’, ‘skivers’, ‘chattering 
classes’, ‘idle rich’, etc.), and considerable political effort is devoted to 
manipulating such terms in the hope that they will resonate with or ‘touch raw 
nerves’ in others. 
 
As always the likelihood of such discourse being produced and the particular 
way in which it is received or ignored depends on the structure of the field; in 
the case of oppositional discourse Bourdieu argues that it will have an effect only 
if there is also some (extra-discursive) objective crisis to which it draws 
attention. (We can of course add that it also depends on understandings of such 
words and the contexts in which they have been used before, but Bourdieu, 
wants to counteract the temptation to reduce reception simply to the level of 
discourse.) Political discourse involves a struggle to conserve or transform the 
social world by conserving or transforming the vision of this world and its 
systems of classifications and the objective ‘di-visions’ of the social world which 
these classifications sustain and reflect (Bourdieu 1991, p. 181). What he terms 
‘strong discourses’ are backed by dominant social and economic forces; a 
contemporary example might be the discourse of austerity. 
 
The discourse of politicians has to be seen in terms of the special relation of 
representation to supporters and the electorate, and the interests politicians 
have in the persistence of the institution and the specific profits it brings them. 
On the one hand, being invested with political powers by those they represent, 
this represents a concentration of the means of production of discourse and 
political acts. Delegates consecrate themselves as representatives of the group, 
usurping power by presenting themselves as their servants, while treating their 
own values as universal, whether knowingly or unknowingly.  As Bourdieu said, 
“when it comes to the state, one never doubts enough” (1998, p.36).  
 
                                                        




Evaluation and conclusions 
The occupational hazard of all academic disciplines is reductionism – the 
temptation to try to make the discipline’s defining objects and approaches do 
more explanatory work than they can. Linguistics’ occupational hazard is 
overextending the scope and influence of language in explaining social 
phenomena. The prevalence of the scholastic fallacy in social science increases 
this problem. It assumes that minds are independent of bodies and their social 
development. Developments in neuroscience are increasingly showing that the 
left-brain scholastic emphasis on analytical reason and language underestimates 
the importance of right brain pre-linguistic understanding and responses to the 
world, which have a gestalt, big-picture, and often emotional character, much of 
which does not get consciously registered, interpreted and articulated 
(McGilchrist 2010). Neuroscience and psychology provide evidence for 
something like the habitus, and for the lasting importance of social influences on 
dispositions and behaviour. Much goes on below the radar of linguistically 
constructed understanding, including where communication is involved, and this 
hidden surplus is inherently difficult to describe in words, thereby eluding 
formulation in given categories and analysis by breaking down wholes into parts, 
which is the method the scholastic standpoint values.  
 
The critical reception of Bourdieu’s work has been dominated by debates about 
whether his work is excessively deterministic and pessimistic. The dominated 
classes seem doomed to accept their inferior position as a result of having 
developed a habitus adapted to it, and been subject to symbolic power operating 
pre-reflexively, so they make a virtue of what is actually necessity, and thereby 
reproduce their position. What anyone thinks, says or does is seen 
overwhelmingly as a reflection of their social position, and habitus (an 
internalisation of the social field); in effect, the explanation is ‘they would say 
that given their location and history’, which leaves little or no room for 
individual reflexivity and responses which might not be read off from their 
position in the social field. Luc Boltanski and Jacques Rancière, among others, 
have attacked the real or apparent fatalism in Bourdieu’s characterisation of the 
dominated, and his belittling of their ability to see their situation more 
consciously and critically (Boltanski 2006; Rancière 2010). At worst it involves 
sociological reductionism, and inverts the problems of interactionist approaches 
so that the content and meaning of discourse is treated as unimportant relative 
to its positioning with the social field and its ‘pre-reflexive’ reception. At the least 
this underestimates the endless possibilities for novel meanings to develop in 
discourse. Margaret Archer has countered Bourdieu’s fatalism both theoretically 
and through empirical research on reflexivity in everyday life, through attending 
to people’s ‘internal conversations’, and how they monitor and reflect upon the 
constraints and influences they encounter, and hence mediate their impact 
(Archer 2007). Although she rejects the concept of habitus, others argue we can 
acknowledge this lay reflexivity without abandoning it, as if nothing that 
influenced us escaped our awareness (Archer 2010).  
 
Yet the concept of habitus is not wholly deterministic anyway, for it involves 
semi-conscious awareness and monitoring, indeed there would seem to be a 
 13 
continuum from the unconscious reception through this awareness to careful, 
self-conscious deliberation. At times, Bourdieu defends his argument by saying 
he is ‘bending the stick’ as a way of correcting the opposite error of assuming all 
action to be based on universal, conscious deliberation. 
 
Tendencies towards determinism and fatalism also beg the question of where 
resistance comes from. Bourdieu’s main answer is that it is most likely to come 
from those who find themselves participating in a social field or location which 
differs from that to which their habitus has accommodated, or which changes 
more rapidly than they can adapt. Given its opposition to individualistic 
explanations, this is always the answer that sociological reductionism has to give 
to the question of sources of resistance. Yet it is simply false not only in ignoring 
individuals’ reflexivity and capacity for critical thought, but also in implying that 
there are no habitats to which people cannot adjust through the acquisition of a 
habitus, and no difference between adjustments that are comfortable and others 
that are painful. Moreover, it ignores the extent to which discourse and practice 
are characterized by dilemmas and conflicting ideas and actions (Billig 1996).  
 
Bourdieu is further limited by his disregard of emotions, both in terms of their 
cognitive content and their motivating power, for it ignores the emotional force 
of particular kinds of discourse. “When people speak of class struggle, they never 
think of the class struggles in everyday life, the contempt, the arrogance and 
crushing ostentation (about children and their successes, holidays and cars), the 
wounding indifference and injury, etc. Social misery and resentment – the 
saddest of social passions – arise from these everyday struggles, in which the 
issue at stake is dignity, self-esteem.” (Bourdieu 2008, p.73) This statement – 
about everyday conversations - is full of terms that refer to moral emotions and 
dispositions and which presuppose reflexivity - yet they are not acknowledged 
as such theoretically by Bourdieu. 
 
However, in his later, more political work, for example, The Weight of the World 
(Bourdieu et al 1999), he does pay more attention to what lay people say, though 
retaining his primary emphasis on the hermeneutics of suspicion. And he also 
discusses the scope for politicisation, arguing that it depends on making 
connections that enable people to see that their problems are not merely 
individual misfortunes but consequent upon contingent social processes. His 
own energetic involvement in the struggle to politicise the public and foment 
resistance suggests a softening of his reductionism.  
 
A less noted problematic feature of Bourdieu’s work is his reluctance to 
acknowledge that communicative intentions and receptions can be non-
instrumental, open, and involving judgements of the good that are not reducible 
to reflections of self-interest or the habitus. He therefore tends to portray all 
practices and struggles of the social field as a Hobbesian war of all against all, 
and to deflate any claims to disinterested goals, or divergence between 
commitments and self-serving beliefs. In so doing he generally fails to 
acknowledge that which acceptance of his own analysis presupposes, namely, 
that sometimes communication (including self-talk) is disinterested. (If we 
accept his approach, do we do so merely because our habitus disposes us to do 
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so and because doing so serves as a strategy of distinction in the academic 
world?; or do we accept it because we think it’s right, useful, revealing?) He 
would probably have said that one needs to find out how far any communicative 
act is interested, how far it is conditioned by speakers’ and listeners’ position in 
the social field and the ‘profits’ available to them, in order to know how far it is 
not influenced in those ways. But the opposite also applies. 
 
In bending the stick to correct for the interactionist error and the scholastic 
fallacy, in acknowledging the unconscious or semi-conscious part of 
communication, and the effects of the habitus and the social field on 
communication, it is important not to neglect the analysis of the meanings of the 
discourse. For example, how else can we understand why countries with similar 
inequalities and social fields produce different political responses? Why is anti-
immigrant feeling strong in the UK but limited in Spain, despite the latter’s much 
higher unemployment; why are French workers more politicised than US 
workers? Here, one has to look at the cultural and political histories of the 
countries and their different dominant discourses. To explain this one would 
have to take the content of discourses, and not only their situation in fields of 
power, into account.3 
 
While Bourdieu’s approach might seem to involve a sociologically reductionist 
treatment of language, his intent is clearly to find out what is communicated and 
with what effect. Academics unaware of their habitus and position within the 
social field and the scholastic fallacy, are likely to reproduce rather than avoid 
distorted communication. Bourdieu’s scathing remarks about the scholastic 
fallacy and discourse analysis seem to assume that the latter must always 
abstract from social context and actions in which it is always embedded, and 
treat practical action as primarily communicative. Neither need be true, though 
these are dangers to keep in mind. His view of linguistics is partly unfair, 
particularly in representing it as looking for the meanings of words only in 
words, “where it is not to be found”, (Bourdieu 1993a, p. 107), but insofar as it 
has some truth, his critique and his approach to language need to be taken 
seriously. Discourse is indeed a crucial form and mediator of power, so anyone 
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